ZitatAlles anzeigenDuring climb, at about FL180, both crew members adjusted their navigation displays to a range of 320nm, the weather radar was set to maximum gain and a tilt angle to alternate between -0.5 and -1.0 degrees.
The aircraft was enroute at FL350 and a speed of 0.83 mach about 2nm after passing N18 W60 the aircraft entered a zone of moderate turbulence, an "OVERSPEED" aural alert sounded and the master warning illuminated. The airspeed had increased to 0.87 mach. The flight data recorder revealed that the pilot monitoring pressed the autopilot disconnect button, no aural alert sounded, and pulled the side stick about 75% of its travel back for about 6 seconds. The aircraft subsequently rolled right and left indicative that the pilot not flying was not aware of his actions. The airspeed reduces to 0.84 mach, the overspeed warning stops briefly for two seconds, activates again for a second, then silences. At this time the aircraft climbs at a vertical speed of 1950 feet per minute. The master warning stops a second later. The crew selected mach 0.76 for about 3 seconds, then mach 0.85, the spoilers were extended. The airspeed reduces.
The pilot flying reported that as reaction to the turbulence encounter he activated the landing lights in order to be seen and see, he noticed there was rain outside. He then wanted to take the handset for an public announcement but dropped the hand set. The pilot monitoring retrieved the handset and made the announcement to the passengers.
The pitch attitude in the meantime increased from 3 to 9 degrees in 5 seconds, and the aircraft climbed through 35,200 feet. The crew reported later they did not hear the altitude alerter that sounds upon deviating 200 feet from the assigned altitude, the spoilers begin to automatically reduce, 10 seconds after the begin of the upset the aircraft climbed through FL360, the spoilers fully retracted, the pitch angle reached 12 degrees nose up, the mach decreases. The pilot flying noticed the decreasing speed and selected Mach 0.93, the aircraft still climbs, the vertical speed increases through 5700 feet per minute, the crew does not notice the excessive climb rate, engine N1 is at 100%, the pilot flying switches his navigation display to a range of 160nm.
29 seconds after the upset began, the aircraft was climbing through 36,900 feet, the pilot monitoring noticed the master warning had illuminated.
44 seconds after the upset, the aircraft was climbing through 37,950 feet, the pilot flying disengaged autothrust and advanced the power levers into the TO/GA detent.
53 seconds after the upset began the aircraft reached its maximum altitude at 38,185 feet at a mach speed of 0.66.
The pilot flying realizsed at that point they were at 38,000 feet and queried the pilot not flying whether they weren't assigned to FL350.
78 seconds after the upset began the aircraft descended through FL370, the pilot flying pulls the altitude select button on the master control panel which activates the open descend mode on the flight directors. The pilot wants the autopilot to reacquire FL350, but notices nothing is displayed on the primary flight display. The airspeed is 226 knots, 19 knots below the minimum selectable airspeed. Both flight directors are then withdrawn from the displays.
At this time the pilot not flying performed a HF transmission with New York Oceanic Center to inform abotu the altitude deviation and turbulence encounter.
102 seconds after the upset began, the aircraft was descending through 36,500 feet, the pilot flying finally notices the autopilot had disconnected and begins to operate his side stick. The pitch angle subsequently stabilizes, while descending through 35,400 feet the autopilot gets reconnected, the aircraft levels off at FL350, autothrust gets reengaged and the aircraft stabilizes.
Air France A343 near Guadeloupe on Jul 22nd 2011, rapid climb and approach to stall in upset
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Bilde ich mir das ein, oder ist das genau dasselbe Manöver, was die Piloten bei AF447 gemacht haben?
Und warum haben die schon wieder nicht gemerkt, dass der Autopilot aus gegangen war??
Liegt das am Airbus, der nicht entsprechend deutlich darauf hinweist, oder sind es die Air France Piloten? -
Das Selbe hab ich mich auch gefragt...dachte alle Air France Piloten haben das im Simulatortrainig aufgearbeitet!?!
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Bei Airbus wird die Autopilot Disconnect-Warning (Gibt es da einen offiziellen Namen?) nicht so wichtig eingestuft wie zB. die Overspeedwarning. Wird nun der Autopilot ausgeschaltet während die Overspeedwarning schrillt, hört man nicht mehr die Warnung, dass der Autopilot nun aus ist. Da ebendiese Warnung nach einer bestimmten Zeit von alleine ausgeht, ertönt sie auch unter Umständen nicht, wenn man aus dem Overspeed herauskommt.